component, which in some circumstances must be allocated among the outputs. More? over, there are even some long-run cost functions which do have legitimate fixed cost components, e.g., putting the dust ofthe moon on earth, which must be allocated. Our first purpose in this article is to find, for a given set of products, a price mechanism which assigns to each vector a of outputs, prices which share the minimal cost of producing a. For this purpose it is necessary to use, for each vector of outputs, the minimal cost of producing this vector, i.e., to use the long-run cost function.
When the long-run cost function does not include a fixed cost component, the A-S price mechanism can be applied to allocate these costs. On the other hand, it is the short-run cost function which is actually used by the firm to calculate the cost of producing a. If the vector a is optimally produced by the firm, this short-run cost function, which, in general, contains a fixed cost com? ponent, coincides with the long-run cost function at a (or perhaps a neighborhood of a). Hence the A-S prices which allocate long-run costs also indirectly allocate the shortrun costs of a. We shall show what part of the A-S prices associated with the long-run technology at a is allocated to the fixed cost and what part is allocated to the variable cost of the short-run technology at the output vector a. There are other situations which require a different approach. The first occurs when the long-run cost function has a fixed cost component and thus A-S prices cannot be applied. The other occurs when the producer is not able to use the optimal short-run technology for the actual production level. In this case the short-run cost deviates from the long-run cost, and therefore the allocation ofthe long-run cost is irrelevant. Thus, the A-S prices which allocate long-run costs are not applicable. Moreover, A-S prices cannot be used to allocate the short-run costs directly since, in general, the short-run cost function contains a fixed cost component.
In both of these cases we shall allocate the fixed cost directly by extending the A-S price mechanism to cost functions having a fixed cost component.
A change in the axioms characterizing the A-S price mechanism is required to share the fixed cost as well as the variable cost. This change is necessary, since when a fixed cost is present, the consistency and additivity axioms cannot, in general, be satisfied simultaneously. Since the consistency axiom, i.e., two goods having the same impact on costs should have the same price, is the more natural, a change in the additivity axiom must be made to find a reasonable price mechanism on the set of cost functions having a fixed cost component.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to do away with the additivity axiom altogether.
It is enough to limit the way in which the cost function is allocated between additive components of the variable cost. It turns out that it is not necessary to specify how the fixed cost is split between variable cost components, but rather that there exists a way of splitting the fixed costs. This is analogous to an additivity requirement on the fixed cost. Changing the additivity requirement in this way yields the result that the fixed cost is allocated proportionally to the A-S prices of the variable cost.
2. The axiomatic approach to cost allocation and A-S prices ? Let Fm be the family of cost functions of m products (i.e., the family of functions OO 00 defined on ET>, and let F = U Fm. We denote by Sm the set Fm X ?7 and S = U Sm. m-\ m=\ The families F+9 F+, S+9 and S+ are defined similarly for nonnegative cost functions. An element of S is a pair (jF, a\ where F is a cost function of ra products, for some ra, and a is an ra-vector of these products.
We shall determine prices for those products when a is produced and the cost function is F. Let T be a subset of S and let Tm = T f! Sm. A price mechanism for T is a function P which assigns to each pair (F9 a) in Tm9 a vector of prices I\F9 a) = (W, a\ . . . , Pm(F9 a)).
Let us now consider those price mechanisms which satisfy the following axioms. 4. An extension of the axiomatic approach
?
We turn now to the question of determining cost-sharing prices for cost functions which include a fixed cost component.
Such is the case, for example, when the actual demand a deviates from the expected demand and the short-run technology which is optimal for the expected demand but not for a is used to produce a. In this case the long-run cost function is irrelevant for the allocation of the cost of producing a. Con? sequently, the fixed cost must be allocated directly from the short-run cost function rather than through the long-run cost function as was done in Section 3. Also, in some cases even the long-run cost function that gives the minimal cost of producing any output level has a fixed cost component (for example, consider the product which is the moon's dust on earth). Unfortunately, the five axioms as stated in Section 2 are inconsistent with respect to such a wide class of cost functions. We propose in the sequel a natural change in the additivity axiom which enables us to derive the existence and uniqueness ofa price mechanism on this family of cost functions. Naturally, for cost functions which have no fixed cost component, the prices determined by this price mechanism coincide with A-S prices. First, we shall point out why the additivity axiom is the natural candidate for a change. For the first price mechanism the fixed cost is allocated equally among all units of the various commodities.
Consider the set
The second one divides the fixed cost equally among the various C C commodities, e.g., the /th commodity is charged in total ? and thus its price is-. m mai The first price mechanism depends strongly on the definition of a unit of the com? modity; changing the scale will not yield an appropriate change in price, i.e., it violates the rescaling axiom.
The second price mechanism violates the consistency axiom; by splitting a com? modity into two irrelevant classifications one can manipulate the prices. For example, consider again the production of red cars and blue cars in amounts ax and a2, where ot\ + a2. By the consistency axiom the price of red cars and blue cars must be the same. But the second mechanism treats these two types of cars unequally by imposing a higher proportion of the fixed costs on the cars which are produced in the smaller amount. In fact, it can easily be shown that each price mechanism which allocates the fixed cost independently of its variable cost violates either the rescaling axiom or the consis? tency axiom. There is no need, however, to discard additivity altogether, since it turns out that only a small change in the additivity axiom is necessary to make it compatible with the other axioms. The idea is to limit the way in which the fixed cost is allocated between additive components of the variable cost. In the example x{ + x2 + C, if C were split equally between X\ and x2, then additivity would be consistent with the other axioms.
However, the question remains of how to split C in general. It turns out that it is not necessary to specify, a priori, how we split the fixed cost between different variable cost components. It is sufficient to require only that there exists a way to do it! This is spelled out in Axioms 5* and 6*. 
